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Abstract
A micropayment scheme is proposed to enable
transactions of different denominations and to eliminate
possibilities that either the vendor or the user in a
payment system misbehaves to get illegal profit. The
proposed offers a solution while keeping transactions
efficient.

1.

Introduction

The Internet is, nowadays, a source for information
seekers to have a variety of services such as stock quotes,
news reports, video streams, etc. These multimedia
services in essence may include text, audio, and/or video
information that have different values for information
providers. As the cost of each kind of service differs
from one anther, every service may need different
numbers of tokens if single-denomination tokens, such as
payword, the payment token of PayWord [1] protocol, is
chosen as the information seeker’s payment tool.
PayWord uses a one-way hash function to produce
successive tokens, and it is frequently referred to among
other schemes in literature, such as Millicent [2], iKP [3],
and MicroMint [1]. With the irreversible characteristic
of one-way hash function, this scheme prohibits receivers
of a payword token from guessing subsequent tokens
while keeping the process of transactions efficient. If a
service costs more than a single token, the nature of
payword token leaves the potential risk to the token
holder that he or she may lose some or all tokens given to
the service provider without receiving anything. When
the span of Internet services consistently grows, the
flexibility of payment tools should be noticed.
In addition to flexibility, the issue of fairness is
generally important for most on-line payments. In the
environment of micropayment transactions, this issue is
usually left intact. When a payword token is passed to
the vendor, it is the user’s potential loss that the vendor
might redeem that token without sending the target
information good to the user. Namely, the vendor may
gain improper advantage over the user in PayWord
protocol if he or she accumulates and redeems tokens
without offering services.
We hereby propose a solution to prevent misconducts
of both the user and the vendor while retaining its
payment flexibility in transaction value. It is particularly
suitable for web sites providing multimedia services that
have payments of different values.
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Literature Review

In this paper, discussion and analysis are focused on
PayWord and other protocols based on the successive
release of elements in a chain of cryptographic hash
values. There are three participants in PayWord: the user
U, the vendor V and the broker B. Each user has to
register with information such as the broker’s name, the
user’s name and the user’s public key, with at least one
broker, which offers a PayWord certificate.
This
relationship is represented by a PayWord certificate
signed and issued by the broker, which binds the broker’s
name, the user’s name and the user’s public key together.
Before U requests a service from V, a fresh chain of
hash values wn, wn-1, …, w1, w0 is generated by randomly
picking wn in formula (1).
(1)
wi-1 = h(wi), for i = n, n-1, …, 1.
Notably, h is a one-way hash function, which is
publicly known and cryptographically strong.
Furthermore, w0 represents a root of the hash chain, and
is delivered to V at the beginning of a service session.
Root w0 authorizes B to pay V for any of the tokens in
this chain that V redeems thereafter.
U’s ith micropayment to V consists of the pair (wi, i).
The validity of this token can be verified by V using wi-1
which is known from the previous payment or from the
commitment in case of i = 1.
If no dispute occurs, V presents w0 and the final token
received to B. B verifies their legitimacy and if
successful, pays V the amount that corresponds to the
tokens and charges the same amount to U’s account.
When V misbehaves, U will lose at least the last token
already sent to V. Even though the value of a payword
token is not high enough to cause serious loss for the user,
a persistently cheating vendor can collect a substantial
amount of money by sending an unexpected service or
nothing at all.

3.

Revised scheme

The proposed micropayment scheme is a variation of
PayWord, and it is also inspired by Asokan et al.’s
proposal, an approach that achieves a complete and fair
exchange [6]. The main idea of our scheme is to make a
valid token a combination of two hash values from two
independent hash chains. These two hash values can be
regarded as two half-tokens. The first is forwarded to the
vendor before service provision and the second is not
sent until the service is provided. That is, unless the

vendor offers the requested service, a complete token
cannot be collected and redeemed. This feature secures
the user from the vendor’s malicious redemption without
offering the requested service.
Before transactions begin, U must register with B and
obtain a signed certificate. Information recorded on this
certificate includes U’s id, B’s id, and U’s public key.
Thus, U generates fresh hash values; pn, and qn are
randomly chosen, and n is decided based on his or her
own need. Via the same secure one-way hash function
h( ), U computes two hash chains pn, pn-1, … , p0 and qn,
qn-1, … , q0 as shown in formulae (2) and (3).
(2)
pi-1 = h(pi), i = n, n-1, …, 1 .
(3)
qi-1 = h(qi), i = n, n-1, …, 1 .
The roots of the chains are p0 and q0, and U sends
these values to V at the beginning of the service session.
Thus, every legitimate token is composed of two hash
values; i.e., the token used in the ith transaction is (pi, qi,
i).

the service. The vendor examines this half-token in the
same manner exactly as the first half was.
In an ideal case, V sends B the session commitment of
U and the last token collected, requesting payment
redemption. B pays V and charges U the value of i
tokens.
Because the proposed enables payments that cost
multiple tokens, the issue of dispute handling should be
more carefully examined. If disputes occur between U
and V, they can be either one of the following two cases.
If V refuses to offer the service U requested after
receiving the first half-token (pi, i), U has no loss as long
as U does not send (qi, i). Even V receives other first
half-tokens such as (pi+1, i+1) for successive transactions,
he or she can only verify the validity of first half-tokens.
Without receiving requested services, U will not send the
second half-tokens. In this case, V cannot get any illegal
profit by redeeming only half-tokens.

U
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V
M1, M3, service

Verify
message integrity;
if true, charge U

M1 = SU(V, B, p0, q0, service_description)
M2 = SV(h(M1))

service, notification
M3 = (p1 ,1)

else
transaction fails

M4 = service

notification

M5 = (q1,1)

Fig. 1. The initialization steps and the first
transaction of the proposed protocol
U begins a new transaction session by passing p0, q0, n,
user certificate, as well as a general description of the
requested service to V as a session commitment. A
transaction session may have one or more transactions
that U pays by the same token chain. V uses this
commitment for token verification when tokens from U
have been received. Then V signs and returns this
message as his service provision commitment to offer the
requested service. The initialization procedure of a
transaction session is completed when the service
provision commitment (M2 in Figure 1) is transmitted to
U. This procedure is shown as the first two messages
transmitted in Figure 1.
When a transaction session begins, U sends (pi, i) to V
as the first half-token of the ith micropayment. As a halftoken, pi also represents U’s payment commitment for
that transaction. V validates pi by comparing p0 and the
result of hashing pi i times. The root p0 is retrieved from
U’s session commitment. If the validity of pi is
confirmed, V may transmit the requested service to U. U
must provide the second half-token (qi, i) after receiving

Fig. 2. Dispute handling
The other case is shown in Figure 2, which occurs
when U refuses to pay the second half-token after
receiving the requested service. V in this case may show
B the information collected from U’s session and
payment commitments previously received. The target
service of this transaction also has to be sent to B. Being
a trusted third party, B justifies the dispute based on the
information offered by V. If it is U’s malicious behavior
to refuse to pay, B will pay V from U’s registered account
directly, and pass the target service to U. Hence neither
U nor V benefits from misbehaving in this case.
If true fairness is not absolutely necessary or the
dispute handing efficiency is a serious concern, the idea
proposed by Buttyán can also be applied in this proposed
scheme. U is charged once the first half-token is sent;
regardless of whether the second half-token is paid for or
not. When V attempts to redeem with only a half-token,
he or she will not be given the value of the incomplete
token. Revenues from such disputes are donated to
charity.

4.

Analysis

The proposed scheme makes the user free from
possible losses caused by payments that cost more than

one token. And it is applicable to most practical Internet
micropayment environment. When a user U intends to
receive some information services from an on-line news
web site V, for example, objects including text files,
voice streams or even video clips satisfying the keyword
are available. If these types of information objects are
charged at different rates, the user of PayWord or other
related extensions has to prepare token chains
representing different denominations, otherwise he or she
will have possible loss if paying multiple tokens of the
same hash chain to a misbehaved web site. The user
therefore has to prepare tokens of all denominations he or
she needs before the transaction session begins. In case
the user requests for a video clip that costs six tokens,
either this user generates a new hash chain and tells the
vendor that each token of this new chain represents
exactly six units, or he has possible loss when giving all
six tokens from the same hash chain. In other words, if
malicious V is given w6 in PayWord, all six tokens from
w1 to w6 can be verified and redeemed directly. Similarly,
if V is given w6 in Buttyán’s scheme, three tokens (w1, w2,
1), (w3, w4, 2) and (w5, w6, 3) will be regarded as valid
and redeemed. Another way to avoid such loss is to
make every payment a combination of tokens from
chains that represent different denominations. Both
situations would not be convenient enough for the web
surfers and would cause restriction to micropayment
applications.
In addition, the PayWord user might lose all i tokens
if he or she pays wi for some service that costs i tokens.
Similar situations occur in other PayWord-like
micropayment schemes. In this proposed scheme, the
two half-tokens, (pi, i) and (qi, i), are chosen from two
independent hash chains. Hence even a service costs i
tokens, V can only verify the received pi. There is no
means to compute a complete token unless U reveals the
second half-token qi. Taking the situation stated in the
previous paragraph as an example, when U has paid pi
and the requested news report has yet to be received, U is
free from any loss as long as he or she does not send qi to
V. It is easy for the on-line news web site to verify pi via
p0, but mathematically difficult to compute or guess qi.
Hence, the web site V collects a full token (pi, qi) only if
U receives the report and sends qi.
In terms of efficiency, our scheme is roughly the same
as Buttyán’s. PayWord, Buttyán and the proposed all
have the same number of public key cryptographic
operations, including digital signature generation and
verification. Although the proposed scheme requires
twice the number of hash computation as PayWord does,
it is still affordable due to the computation efficiency of
hash function. Regarding transmission payload, this
protocol sends 2 hash values for every consecutive
transaction step, which is 1 hash value more than
Buttyán’s scheme. It would not cause serious network
loading considering the size of a single hash value.
In comparison to Buttyán’s and other PayWord-like
schemes, the proposed offers better protection for both
the user and the vendor. PayWord cannot justify the

malicious denial of service when V redeems the received
paywords. U can only minimize his or her loss by
refusing to make further transactions with V passively,
after losing some tokens for incomplete services. In
other words, by accumulating tokens from numerous
users, the malicious vendor still gets a fortune of illegal
profit. As to Buttyán’s protocol, although neither U nor
V takes improper advantage over the other party, V still
bears potential losses when U refuses to pay after
receiving the requested service. U in this scenario will be
charged, but the revenue will be donated to charity
instead of distributing to V. Our scheme does not cause
such losses. As long as the second half-tokens are kept
by U, V cannot make any illegal profit by redeeming the
incomplete first half-tokens. If U refuses to pay the
second half-token after receiving the target service, B
will be the trusted third party to justify whether V should
be paid. Hence the proposed protocol causes no losses in
the scenarios mentioned above.

5.

Conclusion

A variation of the PayWord protocol was proposed to
enable payments of different values without much loss in
efficiency while the rights of both the user and the
vendor are well protected. It solves the problem to pay
varieties of multimedia services of different costs.
Comparing to PayWord, it although requires twice as
many on-line hash computations by the vendor, the
complexity of hash computation should not be a real
burden. Thus the advantages of this scheme lead
micropayment to greater flexibility in real-world
applications.
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